Fire safety concerns for partially occupied Higher Risk Residential Buildings

As a fire authority, the reporters inspected two separate new residential developments under the Government’s Higher Risk Residential Building (HRRB) programme which was set up after the Grenfell Tower fire. Both sites came under the same developer and represented similar issues of concern.

Although both developments were incomplete, the reporters had received partial completion certificates referring to individual apartments, but there were no final completion certificates for the whole building. However, the reporters were made aware that the developers were allowing occupation of completed apartments despite the common areas of the buildings and external areas still undergoing works, and without an overall completion sign off.

Prior to the inspections, the reporters requested documentation from the developers relevant to the partially occupied buildings, including:

• commissioning certificates for all fire safety related systems
• the Fire Risk Assessment

However, none of this documentation was made available prior to the inspections.

On the days of the inspections, the site manager was asked if fire safety related systems had all been commissioned. The manager verbally reassured the inspectors that they had been, but they were unable to show copies of these certificates or a copy of a fire risk assessment.

On inspection, several issues were found:

• At one site, there were access issues for fire appliances to partially completed and partially occupied blocks, because of large planters being sited. This had been done to prevent residents from parking in the central courtyard area, which would obstruct ongoing construction works. However, this also prevented adequate access for the fire service to the occupied high rise residential buildings

• At one site, on a level where apartments were being occupied, the smoke detectors in the communal corridor had not had their covers removed. This would have prevented the automatic mechanical ventilation from activating in the event of fire, potentially putting escaping residents at risk

• At one site, the reporters were unable to locate the override control for one of the firefighters lifts, making it unusable as a firefighters lift. They were then informed that the switch had been installed at basement car park level but had been covered up. An engineer was urgently called to rectify this and re-sited the switch at ground floor fire service access level. However, on inspection by the fire service, it was found the lift still travelled to basement level on activation of the override switch. This again had to be rectified. This issue would have significantly delayed firefighting and rescue operations to occupied flats on the upper floors

• The same firefighters lift was fitted with a smoke curtain at basement level. On activation, this curtain failed to activate due to a poorly installed plasterboard ceiling obstructing its descent

• At another site, the firefighters lift, once activated and under fire service control, would not open its doors when returned to ground floor level. In addition, the original fire strategy drawings showed the firefighters lift being one of two passenger lifts opening on the upper residential floors within 7.5 metres of the firefighting stairs, in accordance with current technical guidance. However, upon inspection it appeared that the installers had configured the wrong one of the two passenger lifts for firefighting purposes, which resulted in the lift further from the firefighting stair being adopted, opening more than 9 metres from the firefighting stairs. This meant that there was a consequent significant deviation from building regulations guidance without any justification or assessment

The reporters’ main concerns are:

• The principle of allowing residents to occupy high rise residential buildings that have not been fully signed off and are still undergoing construction works on site. This is occurring because either there is a lack of understanding from the developers of the importance of fire service access and the correct functioning of fire safety-related systems in high rise residential buildings for maintaining the safety of residents, or there is an understanding of the importance of these systems for residents’ safety but the drive to generate returns on investment takes priority

• The lack of documentation being made available to demonstrate fire safety-related systems have been commissioned prior to occupation

• The competency of the ‘competent persons’ carrying out the commissioning, assuming that the firefighting lifts had indeed been commissioned at both sites, given the number and seriousness of the obvious defects the reporters discovered

The reporters would like to advise inspecting authorities that are engaged in building control consultations, particularly in high-rise residential developments, to closely monitor the development progress for indications that buildings are being allowed to be occupied by residents, and not to rely on the issuing of final completion certificates before initiating inspections under section 7.2.d of the Fire & Rescue Services Act 2004, or under the Government's High-Risk Residential Inspection programme, if and when it appears that the buildings are being occupied by residents.